This paper explores the role o f the interlock ties o f the board o f directors and the external auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion of voluntary disclosure practices. Using data from 149 companies listed on the Dutch stock exchange, we investigated the relationship between a firm 's voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial performance measures in its annual report and the incidence o f disclosure of these performance indicators in annual reports of other companies to which the firm is related via the interlock ties of the executive and supervisory board members and its auditor. To cover a firm 's financial and non-financial aspects of performance, we classified the incidence in the annual report of the different performance m easurement items within the four Balanced Scorecard perspectives o f Kaplan and N orton (1992 and 1996). Our results suggest that firms with board members who also sit on the boards of directors of other firms have a higher probability of voluntarily reporting similar financial and non-financial disclosures in their com panies' annual reports. The experience o f the CEO is relevant for information disclosure about customers, while members o f the supervisory board, especially the chairman, seem to promote additional information about learning and growth. Finally, the experience o f the auditor matters for disclosure of financial performance indicators in the annual report.
Introduction
The concern that traditional financial reports do not adequately represent the multiple dimensions of corporate value today has resulted in a search for new financial metrics (Rappaport, 1998; Steward, 1999) , and/or additional non-financial performance measures Norton, 1992 and Sveiby, 1997) . Associated with these developments has been a growing tendency for companies to voluntarily disclose financial and non-financial performance measures in their annual reports. However, it is unclear whether this information helps firms to gain competitive advantage and improve company performance. Performance disclosures over and above mandatory requirements may positively influence capital providers and other stakeholders in their resource allocation decisions, but may also potentially damage the firm, for instance if they result in increased competition (proprietary costs) or additional regulation. To adequately respond to external expectations and pressures, a firm 's board of directors may need information that advances their knowledge about the economic consequences o f voluntary performance disclosure and its implications for the firm 's legitimacy. The question arises as to which sources o f information help a firm to deal with uncertainty and constraint associated with their voluntary disclosure decisions.
In this paper we explore the role o f the interlock ties o f board members and external auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion o f voluntary disclosure practices. Directors and auditors often work for several firms, which allows them to bring experience from one firm to another (Conyon and M uldoon, 2006) . W e investigate the relationship between a firm 's voluntary disclosure of performance measures in its annual report and the incidence of disclosure o f these performance indicators in annual reports of other companies to which the firm is related via the interlock ties of the executive and supervisory board members and its auditor. The existence of board and auditor interlocks creates information exchange channels between organisations which can help firms to reduce uncertainties and share information about effective and acceptable corporate disclosure practices. From an informational perspective, these social networks are influential in corporate decision-making and control relative to other sources of information because of the trustworthy, credible and, consequently, persuasive nature o f the information they convey (Useem, 1984; Haunschild, 1993; Davis, 1996; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Carpenter and W estphal, 2001; Rogers, 2003) . The idea o f this paper is to identify the cross-firm diffusion o f voluntary annual reporting practices using inform ation from the interlocks of firm s' boards o f directors and their external auditors. W e applied this approach to companies in a small region, i.e. Dutch firms, since relatively small communities are characterised by a high degree of interlocking relationships ((Mizruchi, 1996; Carroll and Fennema, 2002; Heem skerk and Fennema, 2009) . W e used cross-sectional data from 149 non-financial companies listed on the Dutch stock m arket in 2004 to identify interlocking directorates and auditors in a tw o-tier system, and to assess these firm s' voluntary disclosure of performance measures in their annual reports. To cover a firm 's financial and non-financial aspects o f performance, we classified the incidence o f the different performance m easurem ent items within the four Balanced Scorecard perspectives o f Norton (1992 and , i.e. financial, customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth.
Our results show that director and auditor interlocks m attered for voluntary disclosure.
Experiences of board members with similar corporate disclosure decisions in other companies were related to a firm 's incidence o f disclosing financial and non-financial measures in the annual report. M ore specifically, our results suggest that the experience of the CEO was relevant for information disclosure about customers, while members of the supervisory board, especially the chairman, seemed to promote additional information about innovation. The experience of the chairman also m attered for the disclosure of information on internal business processes. Finally, the interlock ties of the external auditors increased the likelihood o f disclosing information on financial aspects, while the experience of the members o f the supervisory board, excluding its chairman, seemed to reduce this likelihood. These results suggest that companies tend to learn from and model their voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in the annual reports on the best annual reporting practices o f organisations to which they are interconnected via their board and auditor interlocks This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the literature on voluntary disclosure studies empirically to what extent voluntary disclosure in annual reports is related to corporate characteristics and other determinants. Findings have consistently shown a significant and positive association between corporate size and foreign listing status and the extent o f voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Cooke, 1989 and W allace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1994; Depoers, 2000; Raffournier, 2005; Boesso and Kumar, 2007) .
In addition, empirical studies show a positive association between board independence and voluntary disclosure in countries in which investor protection rights are high (Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; García-M eca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010) . M oreover, executive and non-executive board members may have different incentives to voluntarily report different types of disclosure in their com panies' annual reports (Lim et al., 2007) . This study adds to this literature by examining the association between board interlocks and the incidence of voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial performance measures in annual reports and the differences in the association between the interlock ties of executive and supervisory board members in a two-tier system and this voluntary disclosure.
Second, the literature on the m easurement o f voluntary disclosure in annual reports uses a variety of frameworks to m easure voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in published reports (W allace et al., 1994; Ahm ed and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al., 2002) . In the absence o f a generally accepted model for classifying the financial and non-financial disclosure items, in this study we used the four m easurem ent perspectives o f the Balanced Scorecard described by Norton, i.e. 'financial', 'customer', 'internal business', and 'learning and growth' (1992 and to assess the comprehensiveness o f firm s' voluntary disclosure on financial and non-financial aspects o f performance in their annual reports.
Third, in the literature on board interlocks, from a network perspective, board and auditor interlock ties to other firms are a form of social capital that provides access to information that flows through the network social networks in m anagement (e.g. Mizruchi, 1996; Borgatti and Foster, 2003) . Board interlocks have been found to influence many organisational practices, including CEO compensation (Hallock, 1997; Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001) , governance practices (Davis, 1991) , mergers and acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993) , organisational structures (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993) , ISO quality systems (Chua and Petty, 1999) and joint venture form ation (Gulati and W estphal, 1999) .
This study contributes to this literature by exploring whether and how board and auditor interlock ties facilitate the inter-organisational diffusion of voluntary disclosure practices in annual reports.
Finally, in spite of the fact that interlock research mainly focuses on the effects of direct network ties, empirical evidence suggests that indirect network ties influence and constrain the effects o f direct ties (Gulati and W estphal, 1999) . In this paper we explore the role of the interlock ties of external auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion of voluntary disclosure practices. Literature suggests that the contents of annual reports are not only audited but also influenced by auditors (W allace et al., 1994) . Specifically, audit firms perceived as offering 'high quality' services may likely incite firms to disclose more information in annual reports (Firth, 1979; Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 2005) . However, empirical support for the relationship between audit firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure is inconclusive (W allace et al., 1994; Ahmad and Courtis, 1999) . This study adds to this literature by investigating the relationship between a firm 's voluntary disclosure of performance measures in its annual report and the disclosure of financial performance indicators in annual reports o f other companies to which the firm is related via its auditor.
The rem ainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we review related literature and develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between board and auditor interlocks and voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial measures in annual reports. N ext the research m ethod is described, and the results are presented and discussed. Finally, we draw conclusions, discuss limitations o f our study, and point out directions for further research.
Literature review and hypotheses development
There is growing agreement that traditional financial reports do not adequately represent the multiple dimensions o f corporate value today. Organisations increasingly rely on intangibles and intellectual assets in their value creation process rather than on traditional production factors such as physical and financial capital. However, mandatory information disclosure on intangible assets in annual reports is lim ited.1 Nevertheless, agency, signalling and legitimacy theory suggest that organisations may have incentives to voluntarily disclose financial and non-financial performance information that is deemed relevant to the decision needs o f capital providers and other stakeholders (Ahmad and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al., 2002) . For instance, organisations that compete with each other for funds in capital markets may reveal financial and non-financial performance measures in their annual reports over and above those that are mandatory. Such disclosures may reduce uncertainty, thereby lowering the cost o f capital. On the other hand, voluntary information disclosure may also potentially damage the firm, if it were to result in increased competition or additional regulation (W allace et al., 1994; M eek et al., 1995; Verrechia, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001) .
In uncertain and competitive environments, new institutional sociology suggests that organisations are more likely to imitate other organisations in their field that they perceive to 1 Traditional financial reports have to provide for the recognition and m easurem ent of physical and financial capital, while the financial statements only have to report on intangibles such as brand equity, patents and goodwill when they m eet stringent recognition criteria. However, it is not mandatory to report information about the valuation of a com pany's intangible and intellectual assets, such custom er relationships, employee competencies, new products and services, and responsive and effective internal processes. be more successful or legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) .2 Driven by the need to gain organisational effectiveness and/or social legitimacy, organisations tend to learn and model themselves on other organisations (Oliver, 1991) . As a consequence, processes o f inter-organisational imitation -or mimetic isom orphism -lead to cross-firm diffusion of innovative organisational practices and ideas making organisations more similar.
This inter-organisational imitation should help to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint. In addition, normative pressures and professional networks also lead to processes of mimetic isomorphism. DiM aggio and Powell (1991) propose that m im etic isom orphism may be affected through change agents like interlocking directorates and consultants.
An interlocking directorate occurs when a person affiliated with one organisation sits on the board o f directors o f another organisation (Mizruchi, 1996) . Interlock literature emphasises the role of board interlocks as an important source of inter-organisational information exchange about potentially effective innovative corporate practices (Useem, 1984; Davis, 1996; Carpenter and W estphal, 2001; Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Rogers, 2003) .
Board interlocks provide opportunities to share strategic information and learn about innovations that might help to create sustainable competitive advantage (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Gulati and W estphal, 1999; Carpenter and W estphal, 2001) . They enable board members to achieve a 'business scan' of latest business practices, observing innovative practices in other firms, and witnessing firsthand the consequences of those practices (Useem, 1984) . M oreover, direct contact with an innovator may help to clarify whether and how a specific innovation might fit unique organisational needs and opportunities. Especially in uncertain environments, interlocks are important to reduce the uncertainty and risks associated with the innovation (Haunschild, 1993; Carpenter and W estphal, 2001) . From an informational perspective, interlocks are considered as influential in corporate decision-making and control relative to other sources of information, because of the trustworthy, credible and, consequently, persuasive nature of the information they convey (Borgatti and Foster, 2003) . For these reasons, network research in management suggests that interlocking directorates are key antecedents to consider when explaining the 2 DiM aggio and Powell (1983, 1991) identify three mechanisms other than competition to explain why isom orphic organisational change occurs: coercive isom orphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; m im etic isom orphism resulting from the standard response to uncertainty; and normative isom orphism associated with professionalism. These mechanisms are analytically distinguishable yet not necessarily empirical (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150) . This paper focuses on the influence o f mimetic and normative processes.
inter-organisational diffusion o f voluntary disclosure practices, i.e. copying best annual reporting practices. Given this, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H1:
Voluntary disclosure o f performance measures in a fir m 's annual report is positively related to voluntary disclosure o f performance measures in annual reports o f other companies to which the firm is related via their board interlocks.
In empirical research on board interlocks, all interlock ties are generally treated as equal connections that facilitate the exchange o f information between firms (Gulati and W estphal, 1999) . However, interlocks may not affect outcomes uniformly (e.g. Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Carpenter and W estphal, 2001; Borgatti and Foster, 2003) . In a two-tier structure, executive board members, who are responsible for the administration of the firm, may use their experience in other firms in different ways from the supervisory members, who are formally independent from m anagement and have to oversee and advise the executive board on behalf o f the shareholders' interests. As representatives o f owners, the supervisory board members, and particularly the members of the audit committee, are charged with oversight of financial reporting and disclosure to m onitor m anagers' behavior and reduce the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Consequently, they may have different incentives to voluntarily report financial and non-financial disclosure in their com panies' annual reports than executive board members (Lim et al., 2007) .
Empirical studies show a positive association between board independence and voluntary disclosure in annual reports in countries in which investor protection rights are high, suggesting that the composition of the board affects voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008;  García-M eca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Lim et al. (2007) suggest that boards composed of largely non-executive and independent directors provide more voluntary disclose of forward looking and strategic information in annual reports than inside directors to protect their reputation as experts in decision control and to reduce their exposure to litigation risk from m anagers' poor m anagement and from inside directors providing m isleading information.
Consistently, we expect that the heterogeneity among board members may also affect the extent to which they use their experience with voluntary reporting practices in other firms to convey information and influence corporate disclosure decisions. Hence:
H2:
The Finally, interlock research focuses on the effects of direct network ties. However, empirical evidence suggests that indirect network ties -or third-party ties -can influence or condition the effects of direct ties on various organisational practices. As a consequence, m odelling the influence of indirect network ties on a firm 's decision-making can contribute to understanding the effects o f interlocks (Gulati and W estphal, 1999) . In this paper we examine the association between the interlock ties of the external auditors and voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in corporate annual reports. Auditors often work for several firms, which allow them to bring experience from one firm to another. They may thus 
Research method Data
The data used in this paper were collected from different sources. First general firm data and information about the interlock ties of the boards of directors and the auditors were collected from Osiris and Amadeus. Osiris is a comprehensive database of listed companies, banks and insurance companies around the world covering more than 190 countries and containing information on over 57 thousand companies. The Amadeus database contains financial information on over 11 million public and private companies in 41 European countries.
Second, data on disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in the com panies' annual reports were collected from Company.info. Company.info is a database that contains comprehensive information about more than 2 m illion public Dutch firms. Two independent raters with an accounting background used content analysis to analyse the information disclosed in the annual reports. Subsequently, these data were m erged yielding a complete data set.
W e used data from Dutch companies, since the Netherlands is a small country that is characterised by a high degree of interlocking relationships (Carroll and Fennema, 2002; Heem skerk and Fennema, 2009 ). An additional advantage of using companies from the same small country is that they have to meet the same institutional requirements, and face the same set o f environmental conditions. As a consequence, they are subject to similar coercive pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . The companies that we selected were publicly listed on the NYSE Euronext Am sterdam in 2004 with their headquarters in the Netherlands. The
Netherlands is a small, internationally oriented country with a codified system of law and a strong equity m arket (Nobes, 1998) . Nobes and Parker (1995) classify the Netherlands at the extreme o f the classification structure, i.e. m icro-based and influenced by business economics theory. At the same time, the Netherlands has a strong equity m arket with a relatively large num ber of multinational corporations (Nobes, 1998 
Measurement of variables

Dependent variables
To measure the incidence of voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in the annual reports, we used an index of comprehensive disclosure. In the absence of a generally accepted model for classifying the financial and non-financial disclosure items M arston and Shrives, 1991; W allace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al., 2002) , we used the four m easurem ent perspectives o f the Balanced Scorecard described by Norton, i.e. 'financial', 'customer', 'internal business', and 'learning and growth' (1992 and .3 This m easurement fram ework aims to provide a comprehensive set of financial and non-financial information on a firm 's performance. 'It includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements the financial 3 Please note that many m easurem ent frameworks use the same broad categories. For instance, the balanced scorecard Norton, 1992 and and the intangible asset m onitor (IAM) (Sveiby, 1997) both classify intangibles in three categories. The categories 'external structure', 'internal structure' and 'competence of personnel' of the intangible asset m onitor are closely related to the balanced scorecard perspectives 'customer', 'internal business', and 'learning and growth' (Petty and Guthrie, 2000) .
measures with operational measures on custom er satisfaction, internal processes, and the organisation's innovation and improvement activities' (Kaplan and Norton, 1992:71) . W e used 20, 17, 12 and 19 performance m easurement items to cover these scorecard perspectives.
The disclosure items were based on items used in earlier studies (Firth, 1979; Hossain et al., 1994; M eek at al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Guthrie, 2001; Olson and Slater, 2002; M altz et al., 2003; Eng and Mak, 2003; Guthrie et at., 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Li et al., 2008; ) . In addition, the list o f items was restricted to items that were relevant for all sample firms, so as not to penalize firms for not disclosing any item (Cooke, 1989; W allace et al., 1994) . Appendix A presents a full overview o f the performance m easurement items used.
The items are classified per scorecard perspective.
The approach to scoring items was dichotomous in which an item scores 1 if disclosed and 0 if not disclosed (Cooke, 1989 (Cooke, , 1992 . Using the Company.info database, two independent raters with an accounting background examined the entire contents of the corporate annual reports to assess the disclosure scores using both the quantitative and qualitative information. To control for subjectivity during these content analyses, in the event of differences in judgm ent between the raters, the best interpretation was discussed in a m eeting of the raters and the authors of this paper. Subsequently, for each company we calculated a disclosure index for each m easurem ent perspective. To compute these indices, the scores of the individual items in a specific scorecard perspective were added and divided by the m aximum num ber of items. Consequently the scores ranged from 0 to 1. Subsequently, for each corporate annual report a disclosure index was calculated. This measure of the overall incidence of voluntary disclosure of performance measures in the annual report was calculated by dividing the sum score on the four separate disclosure perspectives by four. An issue of some importance was weighting of disclosure items. Consistent with prior research (Cooke, 1989 (Cooke, , 1992 Camfferman and Cooke, 2002) , we assumed that each disclosure item and each m easurem ent perspective was equally valuable.
Independent variables
To identify the interlocking directorates we used the Osires database which provides the names of all board members in the sample firm, with their function within the firm. After correcting differences in spelling of the name of the same person, we m atched each board m em ber within a firm to all the other firms in which this person was also a board m em ber (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993; Conyon and Muldoon, 2006) . Based on these relationships, we calculated the average and m axim um disclosure scores on the performance m easurem ent items on the four perspectives for each m em ber in each of his/her related firms, thus excluding the focal firm. These numbers therefore indicated the average and highest outside experience of the board members with disclosure of financial and non-financial measures in annual reports o f their related firms (e.g. Carpenter and W estphal, 2001) . Theories about the diffusion o f information acknowledge that both a best example (i.e. the maximum) and the frequency o f observed use can influence others (Rogers, 2003 -5.) . W e used a similar approach to measure the interlock disclosure scores related to a firm 's external auditor.
Control variables
W e included the natural logarithm of total employees and/or total assets, and industry dummies as control variables. The natural logarithm of total employees or total assets was included to proxy for the size of the company. Agency, signalling and legitimacy theory suggests that larger companies have to provide more financial and non-financial information to m eet the requirements and expectations of their interested parties than their smaller counterparts (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al., 2002) . For larger firms the relative costs of extensive information collection are also smaller. The industry dummies were included to control for industry effects on corporate disclosure practices.
Analysis
Our hypotheses were tested using linear regression models. The regression models estimated the relationships between the incidence of disclosure of financial and non-financial measures in a firm 's annual report and the disclosure o f performance indicators in annual reports of other companies to which the firm is related via the interlock ties of the executive and supervisory board members and its auditor. Before explaining the results of the regression analysis, the model was tested for linearity, homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and normally distributed data. The scatter plots of the residuals show a random array of dots, indicating linearity and homoscedasticity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was sm aller than 2 for each of the variables in each of the regression models, which indicates the absence of multicollinearity. Finally, all variables were normally distributed. Table 2 presents the correlation between total scores on information disclosure and the sub scores in the specific m easurem ent perspectives with and without correction for size effects. The correlations between the total disclosure score and the sub scores with and without correction for size effects ranged from 0.512 and 0.439 for the financial perspective to 0.846 and 0.830 for the learning and growth perspective, indicating acceptable internal levels o f consistency.
[Insert Table 2] Since a firm 's board members or its external auditor do not always have interlocks, some data on the outside experience of the board members and the auditors with voluntary disclosure in annual reports o f related firms were missing. To eliminate potential biases caused by these missing variables, we used the dummy variable adjustment method or m issing-indicator method (Allison, 2001) . This method creates dummy variables to use all the information that is available about the missing data. To produce optimal estimates for the missing predictors in a regression analysis, the dummy variables are equal to 1 if the specific For reasons of robustness we performed similar regression analyses with different measures for the experience o f board members who did have interlock ties, i.e. the m aximum and average interlock scores. In most cases we report the results using the measure based on averages only, but in all cases the results for the m aximum scores were quantitatively the same. Table 3 , panel A and B report the results of the regression analyses for the hypothesized positive relationship between voluntary disclosure of performance measures in a firm 's annual report and the voluntary disclosure of performance measures in annual reports of other companies to which the firm is related via their board interlocks. In Table 3, In Table 3 , panel B we tested the robustness of our results by performing the same regression analyses but using the m aximum scores on voluntary disclosure of performance measures in related firms as the independent variables that reflect the experience of a firm 's interlocking board members. A comparison of the results in panels A and B showed that the relationships between a firm 's voluntary disclosure o f performance measures in its annual report, and the average and m axim um experiences of the board members with voluntary information disclosure in related firms were consistently positive and significant, and thus robust. In addition, and also for reasons of robustness, we performed sim ilar regression analyses with different measures for company size and with and without controlling for industry effects. The results in panels A and B, models 1-3 showed no quantitative differences when different measures of size were used and industry effects were controlled for or not. In the rem ainder of this paper, in the Tables 4 -5 we report the average scores on disclosure of performance measures in related firms as the measures of the outside experience of the board members, while using the natural logarithm of total employees and industry dummies as control variables. Additional analysis showed that the results in the Tables 4 -5 would not be substantially different with other indictors for size and/or voluntary disclosure practices in other firms or without industry dummies.
Results
[Insert Table 3] To further explore the findings o f Table 3 , panel A, model 1, in Table 4 we also used the disclosure scores on the four m easurement perspectives o f the Balanced Scorecard as dependent variables. The additional analyses in Table 4 show [Insert Table 4 ] Table 5 reports Table 5 show that firms whose CEO and supervisory board members had interlock ties, had a higher The findings therefore provided support for H2.
[Insert Table 5 ] Tables 4 and 5 (Table 4 : P = 0.28, p.<0.05; Table 5 : P = 0.26, p.<0.05). The impact o f not having auditor netw ork ties on disclosure in the firm s' annual reports o f performance measures in the financial perspective was also significant, but this effect was relatively small (Table 4 : P = 0.02, p.<0.05; Table 5 : P = 0.02, p.<0.05). In addition, the results in Tables 4 and 5 influence a firm 's corporate disclosure practices (Hoitash et al., 2009 ). In addition, powerful actors on the board may form dominant coalitions which control the decision-making processes at strategic level (Zajac and W estphal, 1996; Carpenter and W estphal, 2001; Golden and Zajac, 2001) . Consequently, the experience of some members o f the board could be more influential than the experience of other interlock partners (Finkelstein, 1992) .
Conclusion and Discussion
Another lim itation o f this paper is its focus on the inter-organisational social networks o f the board o f directors, ignoring the contributions of other actors via intra-organisational ties on the voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial measures in corporate reports (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) . In addition, staff members and managers at business and departmental levels may also influence corporate disclosure practices.
This study, which was exploratory in nature, leaves ample scope for further research. Internal processes 710*** .323*** 1.000
Learning and growth .830*** .382*** .610*** 1.000
Financial 439*** .101 -.041 .185** 1.000 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two tailed), respectively.___________________________________________________________________ 149 149 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Regression results based on the average and maximum experience of the board members and the external auditors
